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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1991, University of Washington Professor Ralph Johnson published a very thorough 
article entitled "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward 
Indians,"1 in which he compared the history of federal policy in the two countries.  The United 
States, as is still true today, had stabilized its policy by entering into the self-determination 
policy era. 
In contrast to the radical swings in Indian policy in the United States, “the most 
singular feature of Canadian legislation concerning Indians is that the 
governmental policy established therein, that of ‘civilizing the Indians, has 
shown almost no variation since the early 19th century when the government 
assumed responsibility for the society and welfare of the Indian population."2  
 
Canada lacked a founding court decision similar to the United States Supreme Court decision of 
Worcester v. Georgia3 on which to ground tribal governments and exclude states.  It had no tribal 
government (only the delegated band governments of its Indian Act), virtually no self-governing 
powers, and no tribal courts. 
 There was reason for some optimism, however, in Canada's adoption of Section 35(1) of 
its Constitution, protecting Aboriginal and treaty rights.4  Canada also came out slightly better 
than the United States in Johnson's comparison of more recent court decisions.  While Indian 
tribes in the United States were suffering losses in such Supreme Court decisions as Montana v. 
United States,5 the Supreme Court of Canada had several cases affirming Aboriginal rights.  In 
R. v. Guerin,6  the Court found that the Government of Canada had a sui generis, trust-like 
                                                 
1 Ralph Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH L. 
REV. 643. 
2 Johnson at 666, citing Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 581, 582 (1978). 
3 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) 
4 The Constitution Act, 1982, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 44, § 35(1) (1985). 
5450 U.S. 544 (1981) 
6[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 
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fiduciary duty toward Aboriginal lands surrendered to it for the purposes of leasing.7   In R. v. 
Sparrow,8 the Court found that Aboriginal rights preserved by the Constitution Act, 1982, were 
not created by earlier treaties or legislation and needed to be protected in their modern forms; 
Canadian federal and provincial governments did not have the power to infringe on these rights 
absent a valid legislative objective consistent with the Crown’s special trust relationship with 
Aboriginal peoples.9  It seemed reasonable to predict that future cases would continue to build on 
these precedents and perhaps even move judicially toward the protection of self-government.   
 In a world increasingly sensitive to the rights of indigenous individuals and groups, the 
colonial powers of former centuries today find themselves under enormous pressure to respect 
the vestiges of indigenous governments they formerly set out to destroy.  In the United States 
and Canada, problems of the proper relationship of federal and state or provincial governments 
to several levels of indigenous government are often focused on the basic principle of self-
government or self-determination.  Although any simple definition is an oversimplification, 
conceptually the idea of self-government means only the right of indigenous governments to 
make their own decisions about such matters as membership, land use, taxation, family 
relationships, forms of government, and punishment of offenders.   
 In the United States, earlier policy periods of assimilation and even termination of 
indigenous societies have to some extent been remediated through the legislative framework that 
began with the Indian Reorganization Act, through such judicial doctrines as tribal sovereignty, 
and through a policy period of self-determination that began with President Nixon's 1970 
                                                 
7 In Guerin, the Musqueam Band of Indians surrendered to the Crown 162 acres of their 463-acre reserve in the City 
of Vancouver to be leased as a golf course.  The Crown leased the land on terms favorable to the course developers 
and different from the terms agreed to by the band before the surrender.  The Court found that the Indians’ right to 
their land was a pre-existing legal right but that the surrender of the land to the Crown created a specific fiduciary 
duty, which the Crown had breached.   
8[1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160 
9 Thomas Isaac, Balancing Rights: The Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Sparrow, and the Future of Aboriginal 
Rights at 208, online at web.uvic.ca/ablo/documents/SparrowDecision.pdf.  The facts in Sparrow involve  
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message.10  Self-government is presently under siege from judicial inconsistencies and worse, 
especially in the Supreme Court; from "citizens" movements out to destroy what they see as 
special privileges given to Indians; and from an unwieldy and sometimes even malicious 
administrative structure.11  Nonetheless, the legal foundations of self-government are more 
present in the United States than in Canada, where, despite the absence of Indian wars and 
outright genocide that characterized much of early American history, Canada's First Nations 
have very little in the way of protection for self-government and its subordinate functions.12 
Canada's First Nations have been failed by policy leaders, courts, and legislators.  Turning to 
international fora, they have found their way blocked by the presence of the traditional nation 
states in drafting the very international documents that would protect them. Thus while in the 
paper language of government it often appears that Canada respects the inherent right of self-
government for its Aboriginal peoples including First Nations, in practice this right has proven 
indefensible. 
 Professor Johnson's readings of United States policy as protecting tribal sovereignty and 
the United States Supreme Court as undercutting it are true today.  Similarly, the view of 
                                                 
10 The standard division of American federal policy on Indian affairs usually contains broad outlines similar to those 
found on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management Site:  an initial period of contact, 
Indian Removal form 1816-1846, the Reservation Period from 1865-1890, the Assimilation Period around the turn 
of the century, a brief policy of toleration, Termination from 1944-1958, and the Self-Determination Era from as 
early as 1961 to the present day.  See http://web.em.doe.gov/public/tribal/histchro.html. 
11 The Rehnquist Court, in particular, was famous for its disregard of set precedent and principle in Indian law cases.  
For a recent work critical of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law cases, see Robert Williams, Jr., LIKE A 
LOADED WEAPON:  THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 
(2005).  See also Williams’ earlier book, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES 
OF CONQUEST (1992).  For documented examples of inflammatory rhetoric against indigenous sovereignty, see 
Chapter 8, "Animosity," in Robert Odawi Porter, SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS: A 
READER (2005).  Although Felix Cohen cautioned that tribal sovereignty was a protection against unwieldy 
administrative burdens, today the administrative burden is gargantuan, both in the United States and in Canada. 
12 This fact was also observed by Professor Bradford Morse,  who wrote in his article on Canadian Aboriginal law in 
the 1994 NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN ALMANAC that weaknesses in the Canadian system meant that "Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada [were] in a significantly weaker legal position than U.S. Indian tribes despite a history of less 
military conflict, constitutional guarantees, and greater political weight, and the fact that they comprise a five times 
larger percentage of the Canadian population than do U.S. Indians."  Duane Champagne, ed., THE NATIVE NORTH 
AMERICAN ALMANAC:  A REFERENCE WORK ON NATIVE NORTH AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
(1994), at 516. 
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Canadian federal policy as continuing to pursue the policy of extinguishing Aboriginal rights is 
still valid.  However, where Professor Johnson could have found reason to hope that the building 
precedents of the Supreme Court of Canada would eventually lead to judicial protection of 
Aboriginal self-government, the trend has been instead to narrow the Court's Aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence to the point that many advocates have turned away from the courts and toward 
legislation and policy to try to reinforce, recover, protect, and expand Aboriginal governments 
within Canada.  Because the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in the United States is a judicial 
doctrine, and because policymakers in Canada keep coming back to the absence of Supreme 
Court of Canada rulings to excuse their own inertia, it is vital for advocates to bring cases and 
arguments to the courts that argue for the recognition of self-government, and vital for judges to 
understand the precedents thoroughly and to elaborate common-law opinions that do more than 
just acquiesce to policy weakness. 
 This paper will briefly address the history of and assault on the inherent right of 
Aboriginal self-government in Canada before describing the multi-faceted approach necessary to 
successfully protect that right.  Federal policy, legislation, international doctrine, and proactive 
aboriginal law and government all have their place in the bundle.  Ultimately, however, it will 
take a better-defined judicial doctrine to protect aboriginal rights in court.  The broad aboriginal 
right of self-government has not been decided there, and many cases are not brought from 
uncertainty as to where the law is and outright fear that the courts, to which many turn because 
of the positive outcomes of earlier cases, will ironically be the means of closing off hopes for 
stronger self-government protections. Legislative and bureaucratic processes are stalemated.  The 
right opinion in the right case could provide a badly needed landmark. 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CANADIAN FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 
 
 Like the United States, Canada has a complex history of treaty relationships with 
indigenous peoples who live within its geographic borders.  Settler expansionism, the illegal 
influx of settlers into Indian lands, with accompanying violence and devastation, occurred 
throughout British America. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 contained a lengthy admonishment 
protecting Indian lands and peoples.  Lands not ceded or purchased by Great Britain were 
reserved to “the several Nations or tribes of Indians with whom we are connected.”13 Governors 
and Commanders of colonies were expressly forbidden from issuing new Warrants of Survey or 
Patents for any of these reserve lands.14  Subjects of the Crown were forbidden “from making 
any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands above reserved, 
without our especial leave and License for that Purpose first obtained.”15 Anyone who had 
willfully or inadvertently settled on lands reserved for the Indians was asked to leave,  
And we do further expressly conjoin and require all Officers whatever, as well 
Military as those Employed in the Management and Direction of Indian Affairs, 
within the Territories reserved as aforesaid for the use of the said Indians, to seize 
and apprehend all Persons whatever, who standing charged with Treason, 
Misprisions of Treason, Murders, or other Felonies or Misdemeanors, shall fly 
from Justice and take Refuge in the said Territory, and to send them under a 
proper guard to the Colony where the Crime was committed, of which they stand 
accused, in order to take their Trial for the same.16 
 
  Treaties between the Crown and individual First Nations, many of which predate the 
Proclamation, also show the government-to-government relationship between the Aboriginal and 
colonial governments.  Early Maritime treaties were often not land cession treaties but "peace 
                                                 
13 The Royal Proclamation, October 7, 1763, online at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/proc1763.htm 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 For a more thorough discussion of the proclamation, see Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763:  Colonial 
Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U.L. REV. 329 
(1989). 
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and friendship" treaties, securing pledges of peaceful relationships between the British and 
Indian governments during a time when representatives of Britain and France were contesting for 
colonial domination.17   Numbered Treaties 1 to 11 took in much of western Canada between 
1871 and 1923; these treaties confirmed the separate status of Canada and Indian nations, and 
were conducted on a government-to-government basis.18 
 At the time of Canada's union in 1867, the Constitution of Canada divided political power 
between the provinces and the federal government.19  Many writers have since argued that the 
rights of Indigenous peoples to self-government were at that time extinguished; the consensus, 
however, is that those rights survived in some form.  Parliament’s power to pass laws for Indians 
and Indian lands, found in section 91(24) of the Constitution, means that provincial governments 
do not have jurisdiction over Indian affairs.  Beginning in 1876, the federal government in 
Canada sought to administer Indian nations through a series of Indian Act legislation.  Today, the 
Indian Act is universally denounced but a series of attempts to replace it or to just hold it invalid 
have been unsuccessful.20   
 
THE SECTION 35(1) DILEMMA 
 
                                                 
17 Thomas Isaac, ABORIGINAL LAW: COMMENTARY, CASES AND MATERIALS.  3rd ed. (2004), 71-74. 
18 Ian Getty, An Overview of Economic Development History on Canadian Native Reserves, 969-983 in Duane 
Champagne, ed., THE NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN ALMANAC:  A REFERENCE WORK ON NATIVE NORTH AMERICANS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA  (1994) at 973. 
19 Constitution Act, 1867, 91(24). 
20Over 600 First Nations (or First Nations communities) are today governed by the Indian Act.  There are about 
700,000 “status” or Indian Act Indians in Canada, individuals who qualify for band membership according to terms 
of the legislation.  Of these, about 400,000 live on actual reserve lands, with the rest living in urban areas of Canada.  
As First Nations jurisdictions do not extend off-reserve, it is often difficult for members living in urban areas to 
obtain services.  Also, there are somewhat over 1,100,000 people in Canada self-identifying as indigenous people.  
Since a clear majority of this larger number does not live on reserve, there is a great deal of confusion and a real 
problem of the dilution of rights of First Nations and their citizens. 
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 A central irony in Canadian federal Aboriginal policy has been that the rights supposedly 
protected by changes to the Canadian Constitution have proven difficult to use or even altogether 
absent.  Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution protects "existing" Aboriginal and treaty 
rights of Canada's Aboriginal peoples, the three groups of Inuit, Métis, and First Nations.21  A 
number of policy meetings and initiatives throughout the 1980s sought to include the right of 
self-government more explicitly in the Constitution, but no agreement was reached.  While some 
argued that self-government was already included, the main opposition to more explicit language 
seems to have been premiers unwilling to grant or recognize self-government as a right of 
Aboriginal people, partly because of fears of secession.  
 In a recent book on the protection of Aboriginal sacred sites in Canada, author Michael 
Lee Ross explains that  
The irony of the overall situation should not escape us.  The Aboriginal rights of 
Canada's indigenous peoples were elevated to constitutional status in 1982, yet 
today, over twenty years later, virtually none of these constitutionally protected 
rights has legal effect.  Most significantly, despite all the attention that has been 
given to Aboriginal title, no Aboriginal community's Aboriginal title has yet been 
recognized.  Consequently, because they have not established their Aboriginal 
rights in the courts--a case-by-case process--Aboriginal peoples are precluded 
from simply taking claims of violations of their constitutional rights to court to 
have them adjudicated straightaway.  This is in stark contrast to the 
constitutionally enshrined rights of Canadians generally, which are listed in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 Canada's Aboriginal rights regime has become moribund.22 
 
 
THE CANADIAN ABORIGINAL FEDERAL POLICY OUTLOOK 
 
 While there is no clear guideline as to how federal government policy will proceed under 
either the present Conservative government or a resurrection of the Liberal Party, possibly under 
                                                 
21 Constitution Act, 1982, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 44 (1985). 
22 Michael Lee Ross, FIRST NATIONS SACRED SITES IN CANADA’S COURTS (2005). 
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the leadership of Michael Ignatieff, the parameters of mainstream discussion were sketched out 
several years ago in a debate between scholars Alan Cairns and Tom Flanagan.23  In Citizens 
Plus, Alan Cairns advocated, policies of assimilation and parallel government having failed, a 
policy that combined full Canadian citizenship and special status programs was the most 
appropriate for Canada's Aboriginal peoples.24  In the very controversial book First Nations? 
Second Thoughts, neoconservative philosopher Tom Flanagan lambasted what he called the 
"aboriginal orthodoxy" of contemporary liberal thought.25 
 Flanagan, whose academic expertise was used by the Government of Canada to 
demystify the Métis hero Louis Riel and to fight against several native land claims, argued that 
mainstream thought and policy had determined several concepts that needed to be challenged.26  
Aboriginal peoples were not special "first" inhabitants; in fact, they were immigrants like later 
settlers (including Flanagan, who migrated to Canada from the United States in 1968) and, in 
some cases, arrived after European settlers.27  Only a racist agenda, Flanagan argued, would 
grant "aboriginal" immigrants special treatment.  European civilizations were much further 
advanced than Aboriginal civilizations and their colonization of the New World was justifiable.  
The concept of sovereignty and self-government in Canada is inappropriate, as sovereignty is a 
quality only of states.  Aboriginal communities are not "nations": only Canada itself is a nation, 
and Aboriginal communities are really no different than other local or ethnic subordinate 
communities.  Aboriginal government on Indian reserves is unworkable.  The judicial definition 
                                                 
23 The books of both men were finalists for the 2000 Donner Prize, which Flanagan ultimately won.  For an 
accessible piece showing their debate, see Alan Cairns and Tom Flanagan, An Exchange, Inroads 10 (October 
2004), available online at http://www.inroadsjournal.ca/pdfs/Inroads_10_Cairns_Flanagan.pdf 
24 Alan Cairns, CITIZENS PLUS: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE CANADIAN STATE (2000) 
25 Tom Flanagan, FIRST NATIONS? SECOND THOUGHTS (2000) 
26 Flanagan was arguing against the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Report (1996), the recommendations 
of which have never been implemented.   
27 While the “origins” of individual tribes are of interest historically, Flanagan’s rhetoric ignores historical realities 
and echoes the discarded rhetoric of the failed American policy periods of removal, allotment, and termination. 
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of Aboriginal property rights neither can nor will provide a workable property regime in modern 
times.  Interpretations of treaties that preserve special rights for Aboriginal peoples are in error.  
Finally, the only way for Aboriginal people to become economically self-sufficient in a modern 
economy is through their complete integration into the existing Canadian economy.28 
 Flanagan's policies would abolish these orthodoxies that prioritize a racial third order 
over the values of liberal democracy, create an obsession with reparations for injustices, and 
"encourages aboriginal people to withdraw into themselves, into their own 'First Nations,' under 
their own 'self-governments,' on their own 'traditional lands,' within their own 'aboriginal 
economies.'"29  The Government of Canada should, according to Flanagan, avoid programs that 
keep or draw people back to the reserves when the natural trend would be away from them.  As 
long as reserves and some kind of "self-government" remained necessary, such government 
should be accountable, utilize independent boards or departments to disperse the power of band 
councils and familial factions, and implement a regime of individual property rights:  "Civil 
society cannot thrive without containment of political power and wide dispersal of private 
ownership."30  Despite their ostensible conflict with one another, neither the "conservative" 
policy advocated by Flanagan nor the "liberal" one advocated by Cairns and pursued to some 
extent by recent Liberal governments in Canada provide a reasonable policy from an indigenous 
perspective. 
 
COURTS 
                                                 
28 The foundational work on this point is that of the Harvard Project American Indian Economic Development.  See, 
for example, the summary of findings on the Project’s main web site:  the first finding is “Sovereignty Matters.  
When tribes make their own decisions about what approaches to take and what resources to develop, they 
consistently out-perform non-tribal decision-makers.”  http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/overview.htm 
29 Tom Flanagan, FIRST NATIONS? SECOND THOUGHTS (2000) at 195. 
30 Id. at 198 
 12
 
 Rather than protect the right of Aboriginal self-government, Canada's courts have 
developed an extremely narrow approach to what aboriginal activities are protected by law.31  
The approach is best exemplified in R. v. Van der Peet32 and related cases.  The Court in 
Sparrow had analyzed a claim of government infringement of an Aboriginal right under s. 35 (1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, and provided a framework for so doing:  1. Was the appellant) 
acting "pursuant to an Aboriginal right," 2. Had that right been extinguished? 3. If not, had that 
right been infringed?  4.  If so, was the infringement justified?  The facts of Sparrow, however, 
did not raise any real issue as to the question of whether the Aboriginal right in that case, which 
involved subsistence fishing, actually existed.33  In Van der Peet, the appellant, Dorothy Van der 
Peet, was charged with selling fish she had caught using an Indian food fish license, in violation 
of fishing regulations in the province of British Columbia.34 
 In deciding the Van der Peet case, the Supreme Court of Canada, under Chief Justice 
Lamer, had to decide upon a test that could be used to decide what qualified as a protected 
aboriginal right.  In so doing, Chief Justice Lamer distinguished such rights from the general 
enlightenment view of human rights:  "Aboriginal rights cannot, however, be defined on the 
basis of the philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment . . . . They arise from the fact that 
Aboriginal people are Aboriginal.  . . . The Court must define the scope of s. 35(1) in a way 
which captures both the Aboriginal and the rights in Aboriginal rights."35 
                                                 
31 See Menno Boldt, J. Anthony Long, and Leroy Little Bear, eds., THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS (1985). 
32 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 50 C.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. R. v. Van der Peet). 
33 Id. at 2, citing R. v. Sparrow,  [1990] 70 DL.R. (4th) 385. 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 20. 
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 Before completing a purposive analysis of s. 35(1) to identify what interests the section 
was designed to protect, Chief Justice Lamer affirmed basic principles of interpretation to be 
used in disputes between aboriginal peoples and the Crown.  First, as held in Sparrow, "s. 35 (1) 
should be given a generous and liberal interpretation in favour of Aboriginal peoples."36  The 
Crown must take care to preserve its honor in respecting the fiduciary relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples:  "Because of this fiduciary relationship, and its implication of the 
honour of the Crown, treaties, s. 35 (1), and other statutory and constitutional provisions 
protecting the interests of Aboriginal peoples, must be given a generous and liberal 
interpretation."37  Furthermore, where there is doubt or ambiguity, that doubt or ambiguity must 
be resolved in favor of Indians.38 
 Chief Justice Lamer's analysis establishes a test to decide whether a particular activity is 
an Aboriginal right given Constitutional protection by s. 35 (1):  "in order to be an Aboriginal 
right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive 
culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right."39  The difficulty of making such a case can 
easily be imagined, and becomes no less extreme with Chief Justice Lamer's further elaboration 
of the concepts:  definitions must "take into account the Aboriginal perspective, yet do so in 
terms which are cognizable to the non-Aboriginal legal system."40 
 Consistent with Sparrow, Chief Justice Lamer did caution that "the court must bear in 
mind that the activities may be the exercise in a modern form of a practice, custom or tradition 
that existed prior to contact, and should vary its characterization of the claim accordingly."41  
                                                 
36 Id. at 23. 
37 Id. at 25. 
38 Compare US canons of construction for Indian law. 
39 R. v. Van der Peet at 45. 
40 Id. at 49. 
41 Id. at 64. 
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However, the test is nearly an impossible one to meet.  First, although the activity must be 
defined in general terms, it may not be among "those aspects of the Aboriginal society" that are 
true of every human society (e.g., eating to survive), nor can it look at those aspects of the 
Aboriginal society that are only incidental or occasional to that society...."42  The holding in Van 
der Peet, however, was that, while an Aboriginal right to commercial fish sales need not be 
proven, bartering or trading fish was so incidental a practice that it could not be said to be 
integral to a culture and thus was not protected. 
 In contrast, in R. v. Gladstone, the Supreme Court of Canada did find that the practice in 
question was protected.43  In Gladstone, two brothers were charged with trying to sell herring 
spawn on kelp in violation of the regulations governing the Pacific Herring Fishery.  To readers 
trained to think of salmon as the paradigm case of a fishery, the idea of "herring spawn on kelp" 
sounds fairly trivial, and the case has been used as a shorthand for the lack of utility in 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence.  However, the most recent research into the history of 
indigenous peoples in the Americas suggests that the herring fishery, including the herring spawn 
on kelp component, is an ancient and an important one.  The Court in Gladstone so found, using 
evidence including Alexander Mackenzie's description of the practice in historical times to 
conclude that 
 The Heiltsuk were, both before and after contact, traders of herring spawn on 
kelp.  Moreover, while to describe this activity as 'commercial' prior to contact 
would be inaccurate given the link between the notion of commerce and the 
introduction of European culture, the extent and scope of the trading activities of 
the Heiltsuk support the claim that, for the purposes of s. 35(1) analysis, the 
Heiltsuk have demonstrated an Aboriginal right to sell herring spawn on kelp to 
an extent best described as commercial.44 
 
                                                 
42 R. v. Van der Peet at 43. 
43 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 9 W.W.R. 149. 
44 Id. at 28. 
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 In court, then, Aboriginal rights have tended to be limited to hunting and fishing rights, 
with some limited decisions favoring commercial practice.  When members of the Shawanaga 
First Nation tried to assert an Aboriginal rights claim to support high stakes bingo and other 
gambling activities authorized by the Shawanaga First Nation lottery law but not licensed by the 
provincial Ontario Lottery Corporation, the Court ruled against them.  Another group of 
defendants from the Eagle Lake First Nation had a similar experience.    Both organizations had 
actually refused provincial licenses on the theory that the inherent right of self-government 
should allow them to conduct and regulate gaming.  The appellants wanted a general approval of 
self-government, but the Court declined this invitation as overly broad.  Furthermore, the Court 
found that "While . . . evidence does demonstrate that the Ojibwa gambled, it does not 
demonstrate that gambling was of central significance to the Ojibwa people.  Moreover, . . . 
evidence in no way addresses the extent to which this gambling was the subject of regulation by 
the Ojibwa community."45  Thus the appellants did not demonstrate that their gambling activities 
"took place pursuant to an Aboriginal right recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 ."46   
 The gaming case, R. v. Jones, stands in stark contrast to the seminal United States case on 
Indian gaming, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.47  In that 1987 case, the United 
States Supreme Court found that the state of California would "impermissibly infringe on tribal 
government" by regulating tribal bingo and card room activities.  The progeny of Cabazon 
include the $20 billion Indian gaming industry in the United States, a telling example of an area 
where Canadian and United States law, though originally based on similar colonial experiences, 
have parted ways.  
                                                 
45 R. v. Jones, 138 D.L.R. (4th) 204, (sub nom. R. v. Pamajewon) at 28.  The Supreme Court appeal was dismissed. 
46 Id. at 30. 
47 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202. 
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THE 1995 FEDERAL POLICY 
 
 While Aboriginal rights were still at court in the landmark case of Delgamuuk'w, and 
while secessionist pressures in the province of Quebec were at their peak, the Government of 
Canada came out with a federal policy that sounds at first blush as if it decides the matter of 
Aboriginal self-government in a positive way.  Though often called the "Aboriginal Self-
Government Policy" or even the "Inherent Right Policy," the Federal Policy Guide subtitle of 
"The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the 
Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government" suggests the complexity and tendency toward 
stalemate at the heart of the policy.  In this policy, put forward under the administration of 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Ron Irwin, "The Government of Canada 
recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an existing right within section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982."  Rather than being a right that can be immediately exercised, however, 
the inherent right of self-government is in this policy merely recognized as something that "may 
be enforceable through the courts and that there are different views about the nature, scope and 
content of the inherent right.  However, litigation over the inherent right would be lengthy, costly 
and would tend to foster conflict.  In any case, the courts are likely to provide general guidance 
to the parties involved, leaving it to them to work out detailed arrangements. 
 For these reasons, the Government is convinced that litigation should be a last resort.  
Negotiations among governments and Aboriginal peoples are clearly preferable as the most 
practical and effective way to implement the inherent right of self-government."  The 
Government of Canada will not recognize individual Aboriginal jurisdictions unless they are part 
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of extensive negotiations between Aboriginal, federal, and even provincial governments.  Some 
principles are not negotiable:  Aboriginal self-government must be within the Canadian 
Constitutional Framework, not aspire to sovereignty in the international law sense, and respect 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Beyond these general principles, the Government 
of Canada already delineated in its policy particular areas of jurisdiction and assigned them to 
separate categories based on whether or not they would be available for negotiation. 
 The first category, likely subjects for negotiation, includes "the scope of Aboriginal 
jurisdiction or authority as likely extending to matters that are internal to the group, integral to its 
distinct Aboriginal culture, and essential to its operation as a government or institution."48  A 
second category is composed of matters that may not be strictly internal to an Aboriginal group 
and would be less open to negotiation with federal or provincial governments.  In the event of a 
conflict, the other laws would prevail.  Many of these areas are in subject matters given to the 
provinces in the federal/provincial division of authority in Canada.  Subjects in the second group 
include divorce, labour/training, the administration of justice issues (including matters related to 
the administration and enforcement of laws of other jurisdictions which might include certain 
criminal laws), penitentiaries and parole, environmental protection, assessment and pollution 
prevention; fisheries co-management; migratory birds co-management; gaming; and emergency 
preparedness.  Finally, in a third category, the Government of Canada sees no reason to negotiate 
                                                 
48These areas, which should be noncontroversial but are under the policy only available for negotiation, are 
establishment of governing structures, internal constitutions, elections, leadership selection processes; membership, 
marriage, adoption and child welfare; Aboriginal language, culture and religion; education; health; social services 
administration/enforcement of Aboriginal laws, including the establishment of Aboriginal courts or tribunals and the 
creation of offenses of the type normally created by local or regional governments for contravention of their laws; 
policing; property rights, including succession and estates; land management, including: zoning; service fees, land 
tenure and access, and expropriation of Aboriginal land by Aboriginal governments for their own public purposes; 
natural resources management; agriculture; hunting, fishing and trapping on Aboriginal lands; taxation in respect of 
direct taxes and property taxes of members; transfer and management of monies and group assets; management of 
public works and infrastructure; housing; local transportation; and the licensing, regulation and operation of 
businesses located on Aboriginal lands. 
  
 18
with Aboriginal governments because the powers involved are too closely related to Canadian 
federal sovereignty.  Among the excluded jurisdictions are international relations, national 
defence, immigration, international trade, bankruptcy and insolvency, intellectual property, 
Criminal law offences, public safety, broadcasting and telecommunications, aeronautics, 
navigation and shipping, postal service, and census and statistics.  Several of these areas, such 
intellectual property and telecommunications, are areas where one might argue that Aboriginal 
governments both need and deserve their own authority.  For completed agreements, the 
Government of Canada will offer constitutional protection to the agreements under s. 35 (1).  
The Government's fiduciary responsibilities will function inversely with self-government 
authority of Aboriginal governments:  "In circumstances where Aboriginal groups wish the 
Crown to have certain ongoing obligations, self-government jurisdiction or authority will, 
correspondingly, be limited.  In such cases, continuing Crown obligations should be clearly 
defined.  There is no justifiable basis for the Government to retain fiduciary obligations in 
relation to subject matters over which it has relinquished its control and over which an 
Aboriginal government or institution has, correspondingly, assumed control."  Aboriginal 
governments completing negotiations are financially responsible for their share of the 
negotiation costs, but the Government of Canada offers loans during the process itself. 
 
NEGOTIATION CASE:  NISGA'A 
 
 A negotiated agreement completed in 2000 is regularly offered as the first real modern 
treaty in Canada and the first land claim agreement to include self-government.  The Nisga'a first 
contacted explorers when they were visited by Captain Vancouver in 1773.  At the time of 
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establishment of the colony of British Columbia, the population of the colony was composed of 
63,000 Indians and 400 whites.  In 1877, a cannery was erected on the Nass River; immediately 
thereafter, the Government of Canada prohibited net fishing in fresh water and distinguished 
between the subsistence fishing of natives and commercial development of the fishery.  In 1913, 
as the fisheries continued to develop, the Nisga'a took a petition to Ottawa, which was then sent 
for presentation to Great Britain.  Between 1927 and 1951, it was against Canadian law to 
discuss land issues or pursue Indian land claims.  In 1989, the Nisga'a and Federal Government 
of Canada signed the Framework of their negotiated agreement, finally signed into law (in 2000).   
 The hundreds of pages of the Nisga'a final agreement are clearly centered around a land 
claims agreement and an agreement as to sharing the regional fisheries.  From the perspective of 
a self-government agreement, the negotiation is troubling in several areas.  It clearly shows the 
contradictions in asking Aboriginal peoples to negotiate for what is acknowledged to be an 
inherent right.  From the Government of Canada's perspective, the Nisga'a agreement is a 
dramatic improvement over earlier agreements that extinguished Aboriginal rights.  However, 
although the language has changed--the Nisga'a agree only to practice their inherent self-
government in ways "exhaustively" addressed in their agreement--this so-called "modified" 
rights approach may only represent a semantic improvement.  In concluding the agreement, the 
Nisga'a agreed to have their special Aboriginal tax exemptions phased out; and the new property 
regime of the Nisga'a agreement moves property into fee simple status, lacking the traditional 
protections of indigenous land tenure.  The so-called final agreement, which took somewhere 
between fourteen and a hundred years to negotiate, depending upon the chosen starting point, 
contains reference to several side agreements and to ongoing financing negotiations.   
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 While some areas of the Nisga'a agreement sound like more complete self-government, 
there remains a wide distance between, as a central example, the suggested legal and policing 
functions of the agreement and those represented on the Internet as representing Nisga'a law and 
culture.  Chapter 12 of the Nisga'a Final Agreement concerns the Administration of Justice.  It 
gives permission for Nisga'a government to establish policing functions and courts, but only if 
they meet certain specified standards including being comparable to similar provincial standards, 
and as approved by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.  Yet although the Nisga'a have passed 
quite a few pieces of legislation since the completion of its agreement, the section on "Justice" on 
its website has yet to be completed.  Most information is three or four years old.  One of the most 
serious objections to the overall agreement between the Government of Canada and the Nisga'a 
is that the 5,500 citizens of its four towns and three urban locals were granted lands that several 
other Aboriginal groups also claim, the so-called "overlap" problem. 
     
LEGISLATIVE OPTION 
 
 For many First Nations that lack the kinds of resources or land claims that would make 
complete negotiations with them a priority for the Government of Canada, a better option would 
be clear recognition by the federal government of the inherent right of Aboriginal self-
government.  Bills working toward this goal have been introduced in Parliament for more than 
fifteen years, attempting to build on the so-called "Penner Report," the recommendations of a 
special committee from 1982.  The most recent such bill, Private Member's Bill S-16 in the 39th 
Session of Parliament, would have offered to First Nations with a land base the opportunity to 
assert their rights and jurisdictions through a relatively simple process of constitution-making.  
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During the bill's time in Committee as a "subject matter," a process that kept it off the floor and 
eventually let it expire "on the order paper" with the session itself, many supporters advocated 
such legislation as a meaningful alternative to negotiation or litigation. 
 Opponents of the bill argued that it had not undergone sufficient indigenous consultation 
processes--despite its having been originated by First Nations in Alberta--was not deferential 
enough to provincial jurisdictions, would result in human rights violations, and raised a number 
of other flags, many of which were irrelevant or applied to previous legislation.  One criticism 
was that the bill would at least potentially recognize Indian Act Bands, creations of the Indian 
Act, as the units of Aboriginal government.  The bill's drafters and sponsors intended for First 
Nations themselves to make the decision as to whether they would be most effectively governed 
as a single band unit, as a confederation, or even as larger Nations reconstituted according to the 
large historical First Nations of Canada.  The bill may be re-introduced in the coming 
Parliamentary session without the support of any of the major parties.  Ironically, the 
Conservative Party of Canada, having won the most recent federal election, now appears poised, 
with the support of the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, a group that represents urban and 
nonstatus Indians, to reintroduce a previous piece of legislation, the "First Nations Governance 
Act," that it had previously fought against.  
 
DEFINING SELF-GOVERNMENT FROM WITHIN 
 
 With the lack of progress at the level of the national government, many First Nations 
scholars and activists are of the opinion that the best way to ensure that the Government of 
Canada is forced to recognize First Nations governments is for those governments to act more 
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positively on their rights and jurisdictions.  One such movement is for the recovery of Aboriginal 
legal systems; this is the strategy called for by the leading Aboriginal law scholar John Borrows 
and supported by several academic programs throughout Canada.    The first chapter of Borrows' 
groundbreaking work Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law is tellingly 
entitled, "With or Without You: First Nations Law in Canada."  "There is persuasive precedent in 
Canadian law recognizing the pre-existence of Aboriginal rights and their associated laws," 
Borrows argues.  "Canadian legal institutions will soon determine if First Nations law will 
continue with or without them."49 
 At least one Aboriginal confederacy has taken the position that it has ongoing 
independence and that no further legislation is necessary.  The Six Nations Confederacy argues 
that, to this day, although it finds itself within the boundaries of another nation, it is itself 
sovereign.   
 
INTERNATIONAL OUTLETS 
 
 Another legal avenue taken by Canada's First Nations has been to reach outward to 
international legal fora as part of the global indigenous movement.  Indigenous peoples are able 
to bring cases directly before such bodies as the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States.  International law, with the basic principle of self-determination for the world's 
peoples, would seem to provide the necessary support.   
 In fact, the basic documents of the emerging international law of indigenous peoples are 
built around the basic idea of self-determination for those peoples.  The 1989 ILO Convention 
(No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries includes 
                                                 
49 John Borrows, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW (2002) at 27. 
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provisions protecting indigenous priorities for the process of development; the integrity of 
indigenous values, practices, and institutions; thorough consultation and participation; and other 
provisions designed to protect indigenous peoples and their resources.50  A good example of the 
balance found in ILO Convention 169 is Article IV: 
l. Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, 
institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned. 
2. Such special measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of 
the people concerned. 
3.  Enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship, without discrimination, shall 
not be prejudiced in any way by such special measures.51 
 
The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1994, states directly that 
"Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination" and may "freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."52  The 
OAS Proposed American Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, 1997, states 
that "Indigenous peoples have the right to freely preserve, express and develop their 
cultural identity in all its aspects, free of any attempt at assimilation"; states must not 
"support or favour an policy of artificial or enforced assimilation of indigenous peoples. . 
. ."53  The OAS Proposed Declaration also contains a broad statement of self-government 
rights: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social, spiritual and cultural development, and 
accordingly, they have the right to autonomy or self-government with regard to 
inter alia culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing, 
employment, social welfare economic activities, land and resource management, 
the environment and entry by nonmembers; and to determine ways and means for 
financing these autonomous functions.54 
                                                 
50 ILO Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989. 
51 Id. 
52 UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
53 OAS Proposed American Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, 1997, Article V--No forced 
assimilation. 
54 OAS Proposed American Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, 1997, Article XV--Right to self 
government, Section 1. 
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These documents of international law seem to provide a firm foundation for indigenous peoples 
including Canada's First Nations to claim protection for self-government rights.   
 In practice, however, because international law began as a law of nations, indigenous 
peoples within nations have had difficulty being heard.  There is a clear sense that the traditional 
nations work together to obstruct passage of meaningful statements and to deny the legal 
positions of indigenous persons.  Two of the three documents cited above, for example, remain 
drafts largely because nation states work to frustrate the drafting process itself.  Even when 
international standards are clear and international organizations such as the United Nations call 
for improved behavior on the part of individual nations, nations are not motivated to act except 
in their own interests. 
 In recent participation before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Canada 
delayed its report on self-determination and then argued that it was not sure that there was such a 
right in international law; simultaneously, Canada has been offering language to drafting 
sessions on international documents that undercuts the rights of indigenous peoples by arguing 
that they are not "peoples" in an international law sense.  The overall dynamic has something of 
the flavor of the heroine of a European fairy tale finding that her rescuer was enthralled by the 
Wicked Witch. 
 
RETURNING TO THE COURTS 
 
 Whether through failed attempts at Constitutional reform, negotiated agreements, legal 
activism, proposed legislation, or appeals to international legal authority, many parties are trying 
to adjust the relationship between the Government of Canada and First Nations Aboriginal 
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governments.  If at any level the Government were clearly to articulate and act on its recognition 
of First Nations rights to self-government, then individuals, First Nations governments, and other 
interested parties could further build on that articulation.  As things stand, however, there is a 
great deal of chaos, confusion, and uncertainty in intergovernmental relations between First 
Nations and the Government of Canada.  The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, sometimes referred to as Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, has been threatened 
with extinction by several Canadian Governments, yet continues to proliferate bureaucratic 
inefficiencies.  In testimony on the subject matter of Bill S-16, the First Nations Government 
Recognition Act, during the summer of 2005, one Committee member stated that the right to 
Aboriginal self-government was not part of the Constitution and that, furthermore, the Inherent 
Rights Policy, even construed most liberally, was only a policy and, as such, could not be relied 
upon in court.   
 Although many would argue that it is best to stay out of court amidst such uncertainty, 
my position is that the multifaceted approach necessary for progress in recovering, restoring, 
building and protecting Aboriginal governments requires continued development of judicial 
doctrine.  Such concepts as fiduciary duty, tribal sovereignty, and tribal exhaustion are in the 
United States carried, albeit imperfectly, in the common law and from there sometimes are 
articulated by statute.  The roadblock that presently exists in the recognition of Aboriginal 
governments by the Government of Canada is in part a problem of interpretation:  the 
Government itself has said that "the inherent right of self-government" is an Aboriginal right that 
is protected as a s. 35(1) right.  Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has said that this right must be 
argued specifically, following the same analysis as would be used for a specific practice like 
selling herring spawn on kelp.  The Government of Canada is unlikely in the foreseeable future 
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to open the legislative door toward a more clear statement of the right.  Therefore, while 
Aboriginal governments should certainly continue to develop their own laws and practices, and 
while those sponsoring self-government recognition legislation should continue to do so, the path 
must also lead back through the courts.  
 One goal of such litigation must be to explain American precedents more completely to 
Canadian judges.  There is some precedential value to American common law in Canadian 
courts, yet the explanation of such cases as Cabazon and the Marshall trilogy in Canadian 
opinions is unsatisfactory. 
 Another avenue might be to more clearly separate the "inherent right" approach from the 
"aboriginal right" approach.  Just because the Government of Canada in some circumstances--in 
its policy and in individual negotiations--treats the inherent right of self-government as if it were 
an aboriginal right does not make it one.  Despite Justice Lamer's distinction in Van der Peet 
between the "aboriginal" and the "rights," the rights of peoples, as argued by advocates of the 
rights of indigenous peoples in international law, include a more general self-determination.  On 
the other hand, there may be some possibility for redefining the test for aboriginal rights itself.  
There is plenty of language in the Van der Peet opinion for a right to a particular form of 
government even if it has been changed through the colonial process.    
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 As examples of how courts might yet clarify matters differently, I would like to briefly 
consider three separate cases:  the contemporary standoff of Six Nations protestors over a 
subdivision at Caledonia, Ontario; a ski resort case, Minister of National Revenue v. 
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Ochapowace Ski Resort Inc., decided on traditional Aboriginal rights grounds (or rather, the lack 
thereof); and the historical matrimonial property case of Derrickson v. Derrickson. 
 For the past two months, indigenous protesters from the near Caledonia, Ontario have 
been trying to stop the development of a piece of ground they say rightfully belongs to them.  
Protesters say that the piece of land at issue was part of land only leased back to the government, 
not sold.   Six Nations citizens moved to the area from New York after their land there was taken 
in treaty action between Great Britain and the United States.  Their descendants have filed a 
number of land claims on contested pieces of the property since the 1970s, and brought suit 
against the government in 1995, but courts have not moved to decide the suits.  When Henco, a 
company that has owned the 40 acres in question for 15 year according to provincial laws, 
started to build houses, protesters occupied the site.55  Along with a number of negotiation 
sessions, the conflict has already seen counter protests by local non-Indian residents, civil and 
then criminal injunctions against the protesters, and early dawn raids resulting in arrests.   
 The Caledonia conflict is a good example of current issues because the federal and 
provincial governments are pointing fingers at one another as to who should take responsibility 
for the situation.  In addition, two separate First Nations governments are involved--the elected 
Indian Act government, which does not support the protesters, and the traditional government, 
which does.  Somewhere up the chain of appeals, the case may go to higher Canadian courts, 
even the Supreme Court of Canada, and become a new paradigm case about tribal sovereignty.  
The traditional Six Nations government has probably the strongest case in Canada for an 
aboriginal rights decision actually favoring its form of government.  The Court should take the 
opportunity to also consider inherent rights evidence, even if it only concludes that a clear 
                                                 
55 Richard Blackwell, Iroquois Have Unique History On Their Side, Professor Says, globeandmail.com (24 April 
06). 
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recognition of self-government by Parliament is required.  The fact that the same First Nation has 
a traditional government (including a system of clan mothers) and an elected band government 
sanctioned by the Indian Act will make for interesting arguments.  In the past, the Court has 
sometimes called for Canada and First Nations to simply work things out, but the Caledonia 
conflict is an excellent example of the need for judicial reasoning. 
 Another area where judicial action could be extremely helpful is in the area of tax cases.56  
Recently a Saskatchewan provincial court heard the case of Minister of National Revenue v. 
Ochapowace Ski Resort Inc.57  Another of a series of cases at least partly designed to test or push 
the limits of Canadian Indian law, Ochapowace involved a ski resort located on a reserve, all 
shareholders of which were members of the Ochapowace Indian Band.58  Brought to court for 
not collecting the Canadian goods and services tax (GST), the defendants argued that 
Indian tribes were independent self governing nations that exercised sovereignty 
in government and social organization and that such sovereignty has not been lost 
but has been incorporated into the treaty. The claim is predicated on the view of 
international law that Canada had not established effective control or occupation 
of the area covered by treaty 4 by 1874. Evidence was heard from elders and 
experts to substantiate that position and that evidence will be commented on later 
in this judgment. As sovereign nations they claim the right to conduct business on 
the reserve without interference from the Canadian government. Non interference 
is given an extended meaning such that it includes the right to govern in an 
unfettered manner. Under this "full box" theory, the right to self government 
carries with it all the necessary ancillary rights.59 
 
The Court found this approach confusing and was unable to grasp that "at one and the same time 
that Indian nations are protected independent nations while at the same time Indians are subjects 
                                                 
56 Canada's tax cases involving Indian tax issues have gone through a narrowing process similar to the Aboriginal 
rights jurisprudence and involving a similar "integral to their culture" test as well as increasingly unusable 
instructions for factors connecting income to a reserve.  For an excellent analysis, see Martha O'Brien, Income Tax, 
Investment Income, and the Indian Act: Getting Back on Track,  CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL 50.5 (2002) 1570. 
57 Minister of National Revenue v. Ochapowace Ski Resort Inc., 2002 CarswellSask564. 
58 Id. at 7. 
59 Id. at 17. 
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of the Queen but still denying the authority of the Crown."60  While the Penner report had called 
for implementation of Aboriginal government as a third order something like the American 
notion of domestic dependent nations, the actual state of Canadian government was delegated 
powers under the Indian Act.61  The court "tried without success to narrow the issue of self 
government," but "Defense was unable or unwilling to narrow the definition of self government 
to anything less than the right to self government and the right to acquisition of resources."62  
With the court seemingly unable to comprehend the notion of tribal sovereignty, a term not 
mentioned in the opinion despite a brief discussion of the Marshall Court decisions, the 
defendants in Ochapowace really have no chance.  The court looks at Aboriginal and treaty 
rights as possible defenses but, given the precedents involving specific infringement of cultural 
practices, can find no grounds on which to rule for the defense.  Although the tone of the opinion 
is in general restrained, there are moments where a sort of pique with unworkable materials 
shows through, as when the court mentions that "the Canadian government has indicated that 
Indians have an inherent right to self government, apparently without forethought as to the 
definition of such a term."63  Because there is no governmental or judicial precedent for defining 
self-government broadly, the court in Ochapowace chooses to define it in a way similar to that 
used by Canada in circumventing indigenous rights in international fora:  self-government means 
only the right of individual adults to make their own decisions.  Consequently, the defendant 
band and its chief, Denton George, are held guilty although the corporations, because of a Crown 
position that their prosecution was not required, are left alone.   
                                                 
60 Id. at 40. 
61 Id. at 66. 
62 Id. at 78. 
63Id. at 86. 
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 Ochapowace clearly demonstrates the weakness of self-government jurisprudence in 
Canada and the need for stronger rulings to clarify a situation left "confusing" by both legal and 
political policymakers.  The case also shows the need for better briefing on the American 
concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-government to show courts stronger reasoning.  Even 
when courts in Canada have made rulings that seem to be in favor of First Nations, a lack of 
understanding of vital concepts that have proven useful in American courts has hurt the strength 
of First Nations governments and communities.   
 The clearest example of such a ruling is the matrimonial property ruling of Derrickson v. 
Derrickson.  In the Derrickson case, a wife sought to have the matrimonial home divided on 
divorce; because the home was on reserve, however, the Court ruled that it was controlled by the 
Indian Act provisions for possession, which did not allow for such division.  The Court 
distinguished the Paul case only by the fact that the wife in the case sought occupancy of the 
matrimonial home with her children; again, the Court found that s.77 of the Family Relations 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121 was inapplicable because of the conflict with s. 20 of the Indian Act, 
R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6.64  The decision was especially troubling because many Aboriginal 
communities have a tradition that the family home should go to whoever is caring for the 
children in a divorce. 
 Both Derrickson and Paul found that provincial laws could not apply to the situation of 
matrimonial property on reserve because of section 91.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which 
gave lawmaking power over Indians and Indian lands to the federal government and not to the 
provincial government.  The doctrine of federal legislative paramountcy required that the 
provincial laws in actual conflict with federal laws be held invalid.   
                                                 
64 Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285; Paul v. Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306. 
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 After these cases, the federal government neither passed laws to remediate the lack of law 
governing the distribution of marital property on reserve in the case of reserve nor respected First 
Nations laws.   
 In testimony on this issue April 12, Tina Leveque, chief of the Brokenhead Ojibway 
Nation in Treaty 1 territory in Manitoba and a representative of the Assembly of First Nations, 
told about the Sucker Creek First Nation, which made its own matrimonial property law, 
endorsed through referendum:  “Even though the law was fully supported by the community and 
addresses the gaps and the problems in current legislation, the response received by the Sucker 
Creek First Nation from the federal government is that it cannot accept the first nations law 
because it exceeds the bylaw-making powers in section 81 of the Indian Act”; consequently, 
even though Sucker Creek was not trying to use bylaw power, its law was ruled invalid.  As 
Chief Leveque explained, “The federal government created legislation in the form of the Indian 
Act, which it recognizes is flawed and unfair, but it cannot accept or accommodate a solution 
from a first nation, because it does not conform to the flawed and unfair legislation it is trying to 
fix.”65    
 The federal government put little energy into solving the problem until about 2003.  In 
the meantime, the Native Women's Association of Canada filed suit against the Queen asking for 
a declaration that the lack of law covering the separation of matrimonial property on reserve was 
in violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as section 
35.4 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which guarantees Aboriginal rights equally to men and 
women.  While the federal government legally challenged NWAC's ability to bring the case in 
court, Parliament held committee hearings in the Senate and in the House of Commons, at which 
NWAC representatives were among those invited to speak.  The House of Commons Committee 
                                                 
65 Leveque testimony. Evidence, House of Commons, April 12, 2005. 
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made a very thorough report in 2005 which recommended a combination of approaches:  use of 
provincial laws as stopgaps; respect for First Nations models, including both codes developed 
within the framework of the First Nations Land Management Act and independent self-
government agreements; and Indian Act amendment for First Nations that have no matrimonial 
property code of their own.66  All of these measures require legislation, however, and it has taken 
almost twenty years since the Derrickson and Paul cases just to get this far.  In deciding the 
original cases, the Court missed an opportunity to recognize custom and tradition to fill the legal 
gap without compromising its rulings.  An opinion incorporating indigenous law would have 
been a much better precedent than the actual opinion has been.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Canada's Indian law jurisprudence shows a misunderstanding of American precedent, an 
unwillingness to decide broad issues, and a lack of judicial will in actually deciding cases that 
would help to resolve bureaucratic stalemates, endless negotiations and claim procedures, 
deteriorating government-to-government relationships between federal and First Nations 
governments, and frustration of First Nations desires for self-government and self-determination.  
The resulting quagmire serves no one well.  Although there is an understandable desire to avoid 
courts that might make matters worse with poorly considered decisions, clearer direction is 
unlikely to come from other legal and political policy sources.  Consequently, the best approach 
to better policy is a multifaceted one that does not depend on federal policy, international 
support, or judicial opinion alone.  Advocates in all branches of government must focus on 
providing the necessary materials for decision-makers.  History has shown, however, that 
                                                 
66 House of Commons Committee Report.  
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progress is unlikely without meaningful legal opinions.  Therefore, Canadian judges must be 
better briefed on the crucial issue of self-government and encouraged to write opinions that fill in 
gaps and provide a way forward in developing a more useful Aboriginal jurisprudence on which 
other policymakers, federal and indigenous, may depend.    
 
  
